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The article has two main objectives: (1) to reveal why the fault principle is considered to be morally 
superior to no-fault liability in primitive law; and (2) to find out the essence of fault in modern tort 
law and then to express the concept of fault in the most precise manner possible, namely through math 
formula. It is argued that the very existence of law is contingent on freedom of human’s will. It is the 
human’s freedom that allows to judge human’s actions. Thus, provided that we consider tort law as a set 
of rules prohibiting infliction of damage and establishing liability therefor, it is fair to state that fault is 
a precondition of tort liability specifically because freedom is a precondition of the very law’s operation. 
Therefore, while establishing fault the court investigates whether the tortfeasor was free at the moment of 
infliction of damage. Fault denotes that formally wrongful act was committed freely. Since establishing 
fault is conducted after the wrongful act has been committed (it is conducted within judicial proceedings, 
which constitute backward-looking research), the inference follows that fault is an ex post conclusion of 
freedom. However, sometimes all the elements of the free-choice situation being present, the tortfeasor 
nevertheless cannot be deemed to be at fault. This is the case, where the tortfeasor could have avoided 
inflicting damage, but at excessively heavy cost. Thus, it is not enough if among the available alternatives 
there is one harmless; in addition, the harmless option has to be reasonable. Otherwise choosing this 
harmless option cannot be expected.
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Вина в деликтном праве: моральное оправдание и математическая экспликация
Статья посвящена исследованию вины как условия деликтной ответственности. Прежде 
всего внимание автора сосредоточено на проблеме морально-этического оправдания принципа 
вины в деликтном праве. В этом контексте сделан вывод о том, что принцип вины следует из сво-
боды индивида и поэтому этот принцип имманентен самой идее права: вина является условием 
ответственности именно потому, что свобода является условием права. Далее автор переходит 
к математической экспликации понятия вины в деликтном праве и делает вывод о том, что 
вина – это понятие, констатирующее, что ущерб был причинен в ситуации свободного выбора, 
то есть в ситуации, когда правомерный (не вредоносный) вариант поведения был объективно 
доступным и разумно ожидаемым.
Ключевые слова: деликт; вина; виновная ответственность; небрежность; строгая 
ответственность.
Problem setting. Tort law allows to reallocate the costs of accidents so that 
the aggrieved person has an opportunity to shift damage he or she sustained onto 
someone else. But this reallocation is available if and only if there is a sufficient 
justification for it. As J. Coleman, S. Hershovitz and G. Mendlow nicely explained it: 
you cannot make your mass mine just because you want so [1]. Therefore, in order to 
succeed in tort suit plaintiff has to prove the existence of preconditions of liability in 
tort, which are: wrongfulness, damage, causation and fault. Wrongfulness means that 
the defendant has infringed some interest protected by law. The concept of damage 
denotes that the plaintiff has sustained some harm. Finally, causation indicates that 
but for the defendant’s behavior the damage would not have occurred. The notion of 
fault presupposes that three above mentioned requirements do not suffice; instead, in 
addition there has to be something else in order to justify the imposition of liability 
onto the defendant. Why is it so and what should it be? – These are the questions 
addressed in this article.    
Recent research and publications analysis. Fault principle is an essential fea-
ture that distinguishes modern law from ancient primitive law. In academic literature 
it is generally recognized that in primitive law person was hold liable for any damage 
she caused regardless of culpability (i.e. regardless of whether the person’s actions 
were blameworthy or not) [2, p. 64]. In other words, the sole necessary and sufficient 
precondition of liability in tort was the causal link between the tortfeasor’s behavior 
and the damage suffered by the aggrieved person. This feature of primitive law was 
noticed by R. von Jhering in his famous work The Spirit of Roman Law at the Vari-
ous Stages of Its Development [3, pp. 19–111]. Further explanation can be found in 
H. Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law [4]. The reason for the strict liability regime (as we 
would call it today) was the fact that primitive man did not distinguish between the 
principle of causality and the principle of imputation [4, pp. 82–85]. Thus primitive 
man interpreted the nature in a normative animistic way: all the natural events were 
treated either as a reward or as a punishment for human’s actions. And since the 
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crucial difference between human’s actions and acts of nature went unnoticed there 
was no need to inquire into the relation between harmful consequence and human’s 
will. H. Kelsen writes that “[t]he decisive step in the transition from a normative to 
a causal interpretation of nature, from the principle of imputation to the principle of 
causality, consists in man becoming aware that the relations between things (as dis-
tinguished from relations between men) are independent of a human or superhuman 
will, or, which amounts to the same, are not determined by norms – it consists in 
man becoming aware that the behavior of things is neither prescribed nor permitted 
by any authority” [4, pp. 84–85].
Paper objective. The objectives of this article are as follows: (1) to reveal why 
the fault principle is considered to be morally superior to no-fault liability in pri-
mitive law; and (2) to find out the essence of fault in modern tort law and then to 
express the concept of fault in the most precise manner possible, namely through 
math formula.
Paper main body. The moral strength of fault principle consists in the fact that 
modern law blames person only for those violations of law that person commits 
freely, i.e. while enjoying freedom and therefore being able to make conscious choice. 
As G. W. Hegel stated it, a human is a subject of law only as a free being [5, p. 36]. 
Thus, the fault principle is deeply rooted in the very concept of law. The interrela-
tion between fault and freedom was noticed by A. Tunc, who wrote: “[t]he law of 
tort, if it takes fault as a criterion of liability, recognizes the freedom of a man, his 
responsibility, his capacity of behaving in a social or in antisocial manner, and his 
ability to choose between good and evil. According to his decisions and behavior, it 
absolves him of responsibility or imposes upon him a civil sanction” [2, p. 65].
Law is a deontic rule appealing to free will, because only what is physically pos-
sible can be morally demandable. The demand is absurd both when it is impossible 
to satisfy it and when it is impossible not to satisfy it. The rule demanding not to 
submit to gravitation is absurd as well as the one demanding to submit to. That is 
why any deontic rule makes sense only if there are some alternatives, which consti-
tute a space of freedom. In such a context the very existence of law is contingent 
on freedom of human’s will. It is the human’s freedom that allows to judge human’s 
actions. Thus, provided that we consider tort law as a set of rules prohibiting inflic-
tion of damage and establishing liability therefor, it is fair to state that fault is a 
precondition of tort liability specifically because freedom is a precondition of the 
very law’s operation.
The concept of fault is an inverted concept of freedom (“dark side” of the free-
dom): while the existence of freedom in the present enables the law to operate, fault 
is an affirmation that the freedom existed in the past (at the moment of inflicting 
damage). From this point of view, it is easy to draw a distinction between wrongful-
ness and fault: while the former means that the fact at hand contravenes the law the 
latter means that the demand to avoid this fact was operative in the circumstances. 
While establishing fault the court investigates whether the tortfeasor was free 
at the moment of infliction of damage. Fault denotes that formally wrongful act 
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was committed freely. Since establishing fault is conducted after the wrongful act 
has been committed (it is conducted within judicial proceedings, which constitute 
backward-looking research), the inference follows that fault is an ex post conclusion 
of freedom.
The proposed definition of fault is completely based on the concept of freedom, 
which has been treated by philosophers in numerous ways. Therefore, the proposed 
definition of fault will be rather vague unless we provide a clear concept of freedom.
For the purposes of present research freedom has to be defined as the ability to 
choose from among several alternative ways of acting. Thus, tortfeasor is at fault if 
(while inflicting damage) he was free to choose from among several (at least two) 
alternative ways of acting at least one of which was harmless. Put in math terms it 
is read as follows: a tortfeasor is at fault if the infliction of damage was committed 
in the situation W, where the number of available alternatives (how to act) A(W) 
added up to not less than two items (аn), and at least one of those items was lawful 
(wouldn’t have caused the infliction of damage) (R), i.e. in the situation W there 
is fault if
A W a a a where n
a A W R a
n
i
( ) = { } ≥
∃ ∈ ( ) ( )



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1 2 2, ,..., , ;
: .
 
                             (1)
This formula demonstrates that fault is present whenever there is a missed 
opportunity of the right choice. If there is no such an opportunity, there is no fault. 
Moreover, the greater the opportunity (of the right choice) was, the greater the fault 
is. The fact that the tortfeasor has acted in a particular harmful manner constitutes 
wrongfulness; the fact that he could have acted in a different manner constitutes 
fault. 
The similar idea has been stated by K. Larenz who worded it in the following 
way. “We speak of fault only where a person can individually be held responsible for 
the act or omission. We blame the person because he could have and should have 
acted differently in the specific situation, because he has acted wrongfully even 
though he could have acted properly had he applied the necessary care or attention 
or good will. The freedom in the sense of the ability to act differently on the one 
hand and the violation of the obligation on the other constitute the elements of 
fault” (as cited in [6, p. 142]).
In short, fault means that at the moment of the infliction of damage the tort-
feasor was in the situation (situation W) of free choice. But the crucial question is: 
when can we say that such a situation is in evidence? In other words, what are the 
necessary elements of a situation of free choice?
First of all, choosing is possible only if there is someone who is to choose. Thus 
the first element of free-choice-situation is a person. But in accordance with the 
law not every individual is deemed to be able to choose consciously; for this reason, 
there has to be not just somebody, but somebody who is capable of making conscious 
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choices. In other words, there has to be legally capable person, which is the person 
who is conscious of her actions and has control over them. Indeed, if the person lacks 
mentioned features her choices cannot be regarded as free choices and therefore there 
is no blameworthiness in her actions. Incapacitated persons cannot be held liable for 
damage they caused specifically because they cannot be at fault.
It is noteworthy that this principle was clearly stated in Ancient Roman law. 
Thus, in Justinian’s Digest we can find the following words: “[t]herefore we ask 
whether an action under the Lex Aquilia will lie where an insane person causes 
damage? Pegasus denies that it will, for how can anyone be negligent who is not in 
his right mind? This is perfectly true. Hence an action under the Lex Aquilia will 
not lie; just as where an animal causes the damage, or where a tile falls from a roof. 
Again, if a child causes any damage the same rule applies” (Dig. 9.2.5.2)1.
One can choose only if there are some options. Thus, the second necessary ele-
ment of free-choice-situation is a variative range, i.e. number of available alternatives 
at least one of which will not cause the damage. This variative range {a1, a2, … an} 
depicts the scope of opportunities that is available to tortfeasor and is dependent 
on extrinsic objective factors (such as the law of nature, technological level, actions 
of third persons etc.). It seems quite obvious that the tortfeasor is not at fault if 
in order to avoid inflicting damage he had to do something that was technically 
impossible at the moment. Another factor that can exclude harmless way of acting 
out of the number of available alternatives is irresistible force (so called acts of God). 
For example, if the defendant’s vehicle is washed away from the motorway by the 
mudflow wave and as a consequence the plaintiff’s fence is destroyed, it is clear that 
there is no fault, because the harmless option (not to swerve from the motorway) 
was excluded by the irresistible force.
What else is needed, apart from the chooser and the alternatives? Let’s imagine 
the following hypothetical situation. A person is offered to press one of the three 
buttons; though the person is not told that pressing the first button will annul the 
person’s bank account, pressing the second one will transfer the title to all person’s 
property to the state; and pressing the third one will grant the person two million 
USD. Will it be a free choice in the mentioned sense? Of course, no, because free 
choice presupposes knowledge of the relevant circumstances. In other words, free 
choice is always an informed choice. Knowledge of factual and legal consequences 
of every option constitutes sine qua non of free choice. For this reason, there is no 
fault if person could not know (a) what kind of consequences would be entailed 
by her actions or (b) that the very way of her behavior was per se illegal. Whether 
the tortfeasor knew the juridical consequences of his actions – this question can 
be easily answered due to the presumption that everyone knows the laws properly 
promulgated. 
Whether the tortfeasor could predict the factual consequences of his behavior – 
this question is way more complicated. It is also known as the problem of foresee-
1 As cited in https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/digest_Scott.htm.
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ability and remoteness of damage. As a general rule, one should be liable only for 
those consequences of his actions that he can foresee. If the damage caused could 
not have been reasonably foreseen, then the tortfeasor is exempted from liability on 
the ground of so-called casus.
It has to be emphasized, though, that while assessing the foreseeability of 
da mage court does not try to find out what the tortfeasor actually foresaw, but rather 
what the tortfeasor had to foresee as a reasonable and circumspect person. In other 
words, the objective criterion applies based on what can be expected of everyone in 
the similar situation.
The elements of free-choice-situation that have been mentioned so far do not 
suffice to define fault though, because sometimes all the elements being present, the 
tortfeasor nevertheless cannot be deemed to be at fault. This is the case, where the 
tortfeasor could have avoided inflicting damage, but at excessively heavy cost. For 
instance, when in order to avoid damaging neighbor’s cheap property the tortfeasor 
had to risk his own life.
Perhaps the most straightforwardly this idea was expressed by Judge Learned 
Hand in the famous case United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. 
Cir. 1947). According to Judge Learned Hand, if we denote as P the cost that has 
to be incurred in order to avoid infliction of damage; D – the amount of damage; 
and L – probability that damage will occur, then the tortfeasor is at fault whenever 
P < DL.
The Hand’s formula is based on a very sound idea. Every human’s action can 
be treated as an act of exchange where something is given away (X) in order to get 
something else (Y) (for instance, when you study at the university you invest your 
time, efforts and money (X) in order to get necessary qualifications (Y)). From this 
perspective one acts reasonably if Y > X, i.e. if the value of what has been received 
exceeds the value of what has been given away. In the context of tort liability, it 
is the tortfeasor’s investment in the precautions (necessary to avoid infliction of 
damage) that is given away; and it is the preclusion of damage that is received. 
As Coleman, Hershovitz and Mendlow stated it “a precaution is reasonable when 
it is rational; a precaution is rational when it is cost-justified; and a precaution is 
cost-justified when the cost of the precaution is less than the expected injury (the 
latter being the cost of the anticipated injury discounted by the probability of the 
injury’s occurrence)” [1].
Thus, it is not enough if among the available alternatives {a
1, a2, … an} there is 
one harmless; in addition, this one harmless option has to be reasonable. Otherwise 
choosing of this harmless option cannot be expected. Moreover, law and economics 
theory proves that even if tort law held person liable irrespectively of reasonabili-
ty-criterion, persons nevertheless would not take unreasonable precautions, because 
it would be more cost-efficient not to take those precautions but rather to inflict 
damage and compensate it afterwards [7].
Having regard to the above we have to supplement formula (1) with one more 
element. A tortfeasor is at fault if the infliction of damage was committed in the 
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situation W, where the number of available alternatives A(W) added up to not less 
than two items (аn), and at least one of those items was lawful (wouldn’t have caused 
the infliction of damage) (R) and reasonable (S), i.e. in situation W there is fault if
A W a a a where n
a A W R a S a
n
i
( ) = { } ≥
∃ ∈ ( ) ( ) ∧ ( )




1 2 2, ,..., , ;
: .                                   (2)
The reasonability-criterion is recognized in Principles of European Tort Law 
(hereinafter – PETL). Pursuant to Art. 4:101 PETL a person is liable on the 
basis of fault for intentional or negligent violation of the required standard of 
conduct; and according to Art. 4:102 PETL the required standard of conduct is 
that of the reasonable person in the circumstances. Moreover Art. 4:102 PETL 
provides important guidelines of how to model the behavior of the hypothetical 
reasonable person. Namely, it is stated that the reasonable person’s behavior 
depends, in particular, on the nature and value of the protected interest involved, 
the dangerousness of the activity, the expertise to be expected of a person carrying it 
on, the foreseeability of the damage, the relationship of proximity or special reliance 
between those involved, as well as the availability and the costs of precautionary or 
alternative methods.
Therefore, according to PETL fault is established by comparing the tortfeasor’s 
behavior with the behavior of hypothetical character (reasonable person): what has 
been actually done by the tortfeasor is compared with what could have been done 
by a reasonable person in the same circumstances. 
The similar approach is followed in common law as well. Thus, in a prominent 
case Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781 Baron Alder-
son defined the negligence in the following way: “[n]egligence is the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordi-
narily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a 
prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants might have been liable 
for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person 
would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would 
not have done”.
Moreover, digging deep shows that this approach was invented in Ancient Rome, 
though the standard of comparison at that time was called slightly different, namely 
diligens paterfamilias. In the Justinian’s Digest one can find the words of Paulus: “it 
is negligence when provision was not made by taking such precautions as a diligent 
man would have done” (Dig. 9.2.31)1.
Unlike the PETL and common law Ukrainian Civil Code does not include the 
reasonability-criterion in the definition of fault. Under the Art. 614 of Civil Code of 
Ukraine a person is not at fault if she proves that she has done everything in power. 
Taken literally this provision requires to take every possible step to prevent infliction 
1 As cited in https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/digest_Scott.htm.
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of harm irrespective of whether particular step is reasonable or not. And though 
some of the Ukrainian scholars argue that reasonability-criterion is implied due to 
the operation of general principles of civil legislation1 the character of a reasonable 
person remains hardly known to national legal science.
Moreover, it has to be noted here, that Art. 614 is contained in Chapter 51 of 
Civil Code of Ukraine that is titled as “Legal Consequences for Breach of Obliga-
tion. Liability for Breach of Obligation”.  For this reason, taken literally this article 
matches only situation where the defendant breaches some already existing (e.g. 
contractual) obligation. In particular, para. 1 of the Article provides that “a person 
is not at fault if she proves that she has done everything in power to perform an obli-
gation in a proper way”. Since Chapter 82 (which addresses torts) does not contain 
any definition of fault at all, many scholars argue that Art. 614 mutatatis mutandis 
applies to tort liability as well. In particular, for the purposes of tort liability one 
should modify the provision of Art. 614 in the following way: “a person is not at fault 
if she proves that she has done everything in power to prevent infliction of damage”.
Although the case-law on the issue is quite equivocal there are decisions where 
courts refuse to apply Art. 614 to torts. In one of its decisions the Supreme Eco-
nomic Court of Ukraine stated: “[a]s to the appellant’s allegation that the court 
did not take into consideration Art. 614 CC of Ukraine, this allegation is overruled 
because the mentioned article deals with obligational relationship that was not pres-
ent between the plaintiff and the defendant”[8]. Moreover, the Supreme Economic 
Court of Ukraine emphasizes that the distinction has to be drawn between contract 
damages and tort damages. So if the damage is caused by the breach of contract 
court cannot resort to provisions of Civil Code on torts and vice versa: if the damage 
is caused by tort court cannot resort to provisions on contract damages [9]. As long 
as this approach is taken it is inevitable to conclude that Ukrainian civil law does 
not have any definition of fault for the purposes of tort liability, notwithstanding 
fault is expressly required as a precondition of liability in tort2. From this point of 
view, the expansive interpretation of Art. 614 Civil Code of Ukraine may be seen 
as the least-evil solution3.
As a result, pursuant to Civil Code of Ukraine fault matters for both tort and 
contract liability, but the definition of fault is provided for the purposes of contract 
liability only. Approach proposed in academic literature (to interpret the fault defi-
nition extensively) poses an important question of whether the essence of fault is the 
1 Thus, under the Art. 3 of Civil Code of Ukraine “equity, good faith and reasonableness” are recognized 
as general principles of civil legislation.
2 See Art. 1166 CC of Ukraine.
3 It is noteworthy that Commercial Code of Ukraine defines fault in a broader manner. Thus under 
para. 2 Art. 218 “[b]usiness entity is liable for non-performance or defective performance of 
commercial obligation as well as for violation of commercial activity regulations unless it proves 
that it has done everything in power to avoid commercial offence”. Although this definition does not 
include reasonability-criterion neither, it is worded broadly enough to be applicable to both contract 
and tort liability cases inasmuch as the concept of “commercial offence” encompasses breach of 
obligations, torts and other violations in the sphere of commercial activity.
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same both in tort and in contract law or, conversely, there has to be two completely 
different concepts of fault for the two realms of civil law.
The answer to this question seems to be as follows. The concept of fault is 
the same in both tort and contract law: fault means that a person (either tortfea-
sor or contracting party) has not done something that (a) could have been done 
and (b) was reasonably expected of her. However, what is reasonably expected of 
everyone (as a potential tortfeasor) starkly differs from what is reasonably expected 
of contracting party, for it is obvious that we are entitled to expect way more of 
the one who has promised something to us than of a random passer-by. First and 
foremost, it means that Hand’s formula does not apply to contract liability. Being 
interpreted in the context of contracts Hand’s formula would mean that contracting 
party is not at fault (and, therefore, is exempted from liability) whenever the cost 
of performance exceeds the value of counter-performance. But that is not the case, 
because according to the principle pacta sunt servanda even if performance of the 
contract becomes more onerous or less profitable than it was expected the contra-
cting party nevertheless has to perform its obligations under the contract. Thus, for 
instance, according to Art. 6:111 (1) of Principles of European Contract Law “[a] 
party is bound to fulfil its obligations even if performance has become more onerous, 
whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of the 
performance it receives has diminished”1.
Therefore, the necessary flexibility of the definition is provided by the rea-
sonability-criterion, meanwhile the general concept of fault (as the omission to do 
something that could have been done and was reasonably expected) applies for both 
tort and contract liability.
Conclusions of the research. The concept of fault in tort law is based on two 
pillars: freedom and reasonableness. When a court concludes that the defendant is 
at fault it means that the defendant could have avoided inflicting damage had he 
behaved as a reasonable person. In other words, the concept of fault denotes that 
that the tortfeasor had a choice, i.e. that there were several alternatives available at 
least one of which would not have caused the damage and was reasonable. Although 
the concepts that are employed hereinabove to define fault (such as reasonableness, 
foreseeability, remoteness) call for further thorough research; this article, grounding 
on moral justification of fault principle, provides general theoretical concept of what 
the fault is. The definition of fault contained in the Art. 614 of Civil Code of Ukraine 
is inspired by Soviet-era instruments; notwithstanding the current Civil Code of 
Ukraine was adopted in 2003, the definition of fault in Art. 614 exactly repeats the 
wording of Art. 71 of Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the 
Union Republics (1991). Therefore, the definition of fault in Ukrainian legislation 
has to be improved so that it includes the reasonability-criterion.
1 For similar provisions see para. 1 Art. 89 Common European Sales Law, Art. III. – 1:110 (1) Common 
Frame of Reference, Art. 6.2.1 UNIDROIT Principles (2016). Exception to this rule is usually 
addressed under the title of hardship. See, for example, Sec. 2 Ch. 6 UNIDROIT Principles (2016).
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Вина в деліктному праві: моральне виправдання і математична експлікація*
Досліджено вину як умову деліктної відповідальності. Автор має дві мети: 1) з’ясувати, чому 
принцип винної відповідальності з етичної точки зору видається кращим за принцип безвинної 
відповідальності, притаманний примітивному праву; 2) визначити сутність вини в сучасному 
деліктному праві і подати її в якомога більш точний спосіб, а саме – через математичну формулу. 
У статті обґрунтовується, що саме існування права зумовлене свободою людської волі. Не що 
інше, як свобода дає змогу судити людські вчинки. Отож, коли потрактовувати деліктне право 
як систему норм, що забороняє завдання шкоди і встановлює за це відповідальність, справедли-
вим буде сказати, що вина є умовою деліктної відповідальності саме тому, що свобода є умовою 
права. Установлюючи наявність вини, суд з’ясовує, чи був делінквент вільним у своєму вчинку, чи 
був цей вчинок проявом його свободи. Вина позначає, що ззовні протиправний учинок був скоєний 
вільно. Позаяк установлення вини провадиться після того, як правопорушення вже сталося, слід 
виснувати, що вина – це констатація свободи ex post. Утім, подеколи, незважаючи на наявність 
усіх елементів ситуації вільного вибору,  делінквента, тим не менше, не можна визнати винува-
тим. Таке має місце у випадку, коли делінквент міг би уникнути завдання шкоди, але заплативши 
за це нерозумно високу ціну. Відтак недостатньо лишень, щоб серед приступних альтернатив 
була одна нешкідлива; на додачу ця нешкідлива альтернатива мусить бути одночасно розум-
ною. У противному разі не можна очікувати, що її буде обрано. Автор доходить висновку, що 
вина – це поняття, яке констатує, що шкоди було завдано в ситуації вільного вибору, тобто в 
ситуації, коли правомірний (нешкідливий) варіант поведінки був об’єктивно доступним і розумно 
очікуваним.
Ключові слова: делікт; вина; винна відповідальність; недбалість; сувора відповідальність.
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